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The applicability of existing legal precedents and paradigms to
the Internet (also "the Net") is more than just an interesting question.
For years the Internet was home only to research scientists and com-
puter aficionados. Suddenly, the Internet has become a dominant
force in education, business, government, and entertainment in the
United States and throughout the world. Thirty-seven million users in
161 countries connect to each other (generating 100 million e-mail
messages every day)1 and to a dazzling array of on-line services and
products, at negligible cost.2 Commercial service providers-the bell-
wethers of future growth and viability-have flocked to the Net in
recent years. The number of companies on the Internet reached al-
most 20,000 as of August 1994, up from fewer than 100 in 1990; and
that number, like all of the statistics about the net, is escalating at a
dramatic rate.3
In the face of such a new, different, popular, powerful, and ubiq-
uitous medium, legal scholars (and just about everyone else) are ask-
ing how and whether laws created for the physical world will apply to
the Internet. The Clinton Administration's Information Infrastruc-
ture Task Force is considering the fit between existing copyright and
* Professor of Law and Faculty Advisor to the Federal Communications Law Journal,
Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
1. On-line Exchanges Can Reach Thousands, PLAIN DEALER, June 11, 1995, at 17A.
2. Latest Estimates of Internet Growth, ONLINE NEWSLETTER, Nov. 1994; Win Treese, The
Internet Index, Jan. 2, 1996 (available at: http://www.openmarket.comhintindex/96-al.htm); Net-
work Wizards, Distributions by Top-Level Domain Name (by name), Internet Domain Survey
(Jan. 1996) (available at: http://www.nw.comlzone/www/dist-byname.html).
3. Jared Sandberg, Net Working: Corporate America Is Falling in Love with the Internet,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1994, at R14.
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privacy laws and what the Administration calls the "national informa-
tion infrastructure" ("NII").4 Congress recently enacted a significant
new curb on sexually explicit expression on the Net5 and is presently
debating bills to amend copyright law6 to respond to the demands of
the on-line environment.7 Increasingly, courts, local prosecutors, and
civil litigants are testing the applicability of defamation, 8 copyright,9
trademark, 10 criminal," and export control. 2 The media has gener-
ated an avalanche of Internet stories.3 Law reviews, and those of us
who write for them, have focused extensive attention on the interac-
tion of law and the Net, particularly through symposia-like this
one-dedicated to the legal questions presented by the Internet and
other electronic networks.' 4
Byron Marchant and Raymond Kurz make important contribu-
tions to the debate over the applicability of existing law to cyberspace
4. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUC-
TURE AGENDA FOR ACTION 5 (1993). The Task Force includes representatives from the Depart-
ments of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Energy, Housing and Urban Development,
Interior, Justice, State, and Veterans Affairs; from the Central Intelligence Agency, Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Trade Commission, Gen-
eral Services Administration, and National Economic Council; and from the National Science
Foundation, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the Vice President's
office. The Task Force is divided into three committees-the Telecommunications Policy Com-
mittee, Information Policy Committee, and Applications and Technology Committee-which, in
turn, are further divided into working groups and subworking groups. See generally Fred H.
Cate, The National Information Infrastructure: Policymakers and Policy Making, 6 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 43, 46-48 (1995) (describing the communication breakdowns and their role in guid-
ing the development of NII).
5. On February 1, 1996, Congress passed the Telecommunications Decency Act of 1996,
criminalizing the knowing use of an "interactive computer system" to transmit or display to a
minor of "any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary commu-
nity standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs." Telecommunications Decency Act of
1996, S. 652, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 502(d).
6. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1988).
7. S. 1284, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
8. See Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Stratton
Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
9. See Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Sega Enters. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Playboy En-
ters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
10. See MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
11. See United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (granting motion to
quash indictment); United States v. LaMacehia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994); see also Kara
Swisher, On-Line Child Pornography Charged as 12 Are Arrested, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1995, at
Al.
12. See Computer Software Writer Won't Be Prosecuted, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1996, at D2.
13. The Lexis/Nexis CURNWS database of periodicals reveals 187,112 stories in the past
two years in which the word "Internet" appears.
14. The Lexis/Nexis ALLREV database of law reviews reveals 254 articles since January 1,
1994 in which the word "Internet" appears.
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in their articles in this issue of the Howard Law Journal."5 In so doing,
they demonstrate both the importance of the topic and the escalating
need for more thoughtful, forward-looking analysis. Despite the pop-
ularity of the Internet as a medium of communication and commerce
and as a subject for debate, cyberspace presents so many and such
fundamental challenges to our current legal regime that we are only
beginning to make a dent in understanding these challenges, much
less in tackling them. Marchant and Kurz provide an instructive guide
to the range of issues that Internet users face and to the complexity of
applying non-electronic legal precedents-in Kurz's article, particu-
larly those dealing with copyright law-to the Internet.
This complexity reflects many features of the Internet. For exam-
ple, the Internet is inherently global. No other medium crosses not
only every state boundary, but also the national boundaries of the ma-
jority of countries in the world.16 The Internet also crosses the regu-
latory boundaries that have come to dominate U.S. communications
law. The Net provides content, like broadcasting, but it also carries
the content of others, like telephone companies. It provides many
channels, like cable television, but it also delivers mail, like the post
office (only faster). The Net offers newspapers and magazines, pro-
vides low-cost venues for street corner speakers, and carries govern-
ment information, but is neither owned nor operated by the
government. Existing regulatory models, which focus-I would ar-
gue, inappropriately-on the technological medium, simply do not
fit. 7 The technologies of the Internet, which are many and complex
in their own right, play havoc with the assumptions underlying many
laws about how content is to be created, delivered, and accessed; how
assent is to be manifest; and who is responsible for controlling con-
tent. For example, how do you "sign" an on-line contract? Finally,
the application of current law to the Internet is difficult because there
is no single entity-the Internet-to which to apply the law. Rather
than a single "it," the Internet is "they" or, more accurately, "we,"
15. Byron F. Marchant, On-line on the Internet: First Amendment and Intellectual Property
Uncertainties in the On-Line World, 39 How. L.J. 477 (1996); Raymond A. Kurz & Celine M.
Jimenez, Copyrights On-Line, 39 How. L.J. 531 (1996).
16. See generally Fred H. Cate, Global Information Policymaking and Domestic Law, 1 IND.
J. GLOBAL_ LEGAL STUD. 467 (1994) (discussing the inherently global characteristics of informa-
tion and its nature in the global economy).
17. See generally Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information Infra-
structure, 30 WAKE FOREST L. Ruv. 1 (1995) (asserting that new technologies deserve special
treatment under the First Amendment).
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because every user is also a provider of content, and every customer is
also a provider of services.
While Marchant and Kurz both illustrate some of the difficulty of
applying existing law in the face of these and other factors, neither
fully suggests the serious nature of the Internet challenges to existing
law or the significance of the consequences of the blind application of
that law to the Internet. Consider two examples: the regulation of
obscenity and the applicability of copyright law.
II. OBSCENITY
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the First Amend-
ment's protection does not extend to the distribution or public exhibi-
tion of sexually explicit expression that is "obscene." In 1957 in Roth
v. United States, 18 the court held that "obscenity is not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech or press,"19 but declined to pro-
vide a specific definition for "obscenity." Roth set off more than a
decade of judicial confusion and indecision about the definition of ob-
scenity, leading the late Justice Stewart to write in 1964 that an intelli-
gent definition might be impossible, but "I know it when I see it." ° In
1973, the Court finally adopted a specific, albeit subjective, definition
of obscenity. In Miller v. California,21 a 5-4 majority held that works
are obscene, and therefore outside the protection of the First Amend-
ment, only if "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that (1) the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest; (2) the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual or excretory conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (3) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.22 In Miller and subse-
quent cases, the Court stressed that the first two prongs of the test
could be judged under subjective local or state community stan-
dards.3 Writing for the Court in Miller, Chief Justice Burger stated
"[p]eople in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this
diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniform-
ity."24  There cannot be "fixed, uniform national standards of pre-
18. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
19. id. at 485.
20. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
21. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
22. Id. at 24.
23. ld.; Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
24. Miller, 413 U.S. at 20.
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cisely what appeals to the 'prurient interest' or is 'patently offensive.'
... [O]ur nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to
reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated for all 50
states in a single formulation .. ,,25 Redeeming literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value, on the other hand, is not a subject for
local standards and must therefore be judged under a national "rea-
sonable person" standard.
2 6
Contemporaneously with the Roth-Miller line of cases, which
dealt with distribution and public display of obscene material, the
court also decided Stanley v. Georgia,27 which involved the possession
of obscenity. In Stanley the court held, without dissent, that the Con-
stitution protected the possession of sexually explicit material, even if
that material was legally obscene. Writing for the court, Justice Mar-
shall held that while the "[s]tates retain broad power to regulate ob-
scenity[,] that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the
individual in the privacy of his own home." 8 The court based its deci-
sion both on the "right to receive information and ideas, regardless of
their social worth,"2 9 which Justice Marshall wrote "is fundamental to
our free society," and on the "right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusion into one's pri-
vacy."3 ° The Georgia law at issue in the case criminalized possession
of obscene material. The Court characterized the law as a "drastic
invasion of personal liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments,"3 and concluded "[i]f the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giv-
ing government the power to control men's minds."
' 32
Read together, Miller and Stanley indicate that it is the threat of
harm posed by distribution or public performance of obscene mate-
rial, and not a perceived threat from its possession by an individual,
that permits criminalization of the former but not the latter. These
possible harms include exposure to minors, accidental exposure to un-
25. Id. at 30-33.
26. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
27. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
28. Id. at 568.
29. Id. at 564.
30. Id.




witting adults, and "secondary" effects such as prostitution and neigh-
borhood deterioration. The Court's logic therefore suggests that if it
were possible to receive obscenity in the home without posing any of
the risks that distribution or public performance were feared inher-
ently to impose, then the First Amendment would require that the
government permit it.33 In fact, the Court went out of its way in Stan-
ley to note that even if it could be shown "that exposure to obscene
materials may lead to deviant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual vio-
lence" 34-an assertion for which the Court found "little empirical ba-
sis" 35-"the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene
matter on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it
may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the ground that they
may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits."36
It is clear today that the distribution or public exhibition of sexu-
ally explicit expression that meets the Miller definition for obscenity
may constitutionally be banned, whether the alleged obscenity is
printed, broadcasted, mailed, distributed by telephone, or made avail-
able via the Internet.37 The delivery medium is not, however, irrele-
vant to the regulation of obscenity. In the context of the Internet,
traditional obscenity law challenges our understanding of "contempo-
rary community standards" and may exceed constitutional limitations
under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Stanley.
The problem of defining the applicable community is clearly
evinced in the pending appeal of Robert and Carleen Thomas. The
Thomases were convicted by a Memphis, Tennessee, jury in 1994 for
operating the Amateur Action electronic bulletin board in Milpitas,
California.38 Amateur Action provided a wide variety of sexually ex-
plicit pictures to paying subscribers, who connected to the bulletin
board using modems and telephone lines. A Tennessee postal inspec-
tor joined the Thomas' bulletin board and downloaded sexually ex-
33. Id. at 566-68.
34. Id at 566.
35. Id
36. Id.
37. Federal law today prohibits the sale of "an obscene visual depiction" on federal prop-
erty; the mailing, importation, and interstate transportation of obscene matter; selling obscene
material which has been "shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce;" the distri-
bution of obscene matter by cable television; the transmission of obscenity by telephone in the
District of Columbia or across state lines; and the broadcasting of obscene language "by means
of radio communication." 18 U.S.C. §§ 1460-1469 (1988); 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
38. United States v. Thomas, CR-94-20019-G (W.D. Tenn. July 28, 1994) (verdict), aff'd, 74
F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
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plicit images. He also requested that a videotape be sent to him by
UPS, and he sent to the Thomases an unsolicited video tape of child
pornography. The Memphis jury acquitted the Thomases on charges
of purveying child pornography, but convicted them on eleven counts
of interstate transmission and transportation of obscenity for their
bulletin board displays. Judge Julia Gibbons sentenced Robert and
Carleen Thomas to thirty-seven and thirty months in prison, respec-
tively, and authorized the government to seize the Amateur Action
computers.39
The convictions were upheld by the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.4" In its amicus brief, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a
Washington-based, non-profit organization that explores legal, policy,
and social issues surrounding information technologies raised the im-
portant issue of whether it was constitutional for a Memphis jury to
apply Memphis standards when evaluating whether the material
downloaded from Milpitas, California, met the Miller definition of
"obscenity."
Tennessee is but a single locality that can access the international
telecommunications network generally and the Amateur Action
bulletin board system specifically. Robert and Carleen Thomas had
no physical contacts with the State of Tennessee, they had not ad-
vertised in any medium directed primarily at Tennessee, they had
not physically visited Tennessee, nor had they any assets or other
contacts there. The law enforcement official in Tennessee, not the
Thomases, took the actions required to gain access to the materials,
and it was his action, not the Thomases, that caused them to be
"transported" into Tennessee (i.e., copies to his local hard disk).
The Thomases may indeed have been entirely unaware that they
had somehow entered the Tennessee market and had subjected
themselves to the standards applicable in that community.4
Applying Memphis standards to the Thomases runs contrary to
the Supreme Court's position in Miller that "[p]eople in different
States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be
strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity."42 Because the
Internet-like the telephone system used to access the Amateur Ac-
39. United States v. Thomas, CR-94-20019-G (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 13, 1994) (conviction and
forfeiture order).
40. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
41. Brief for amicus curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation at 4, Thomas v. United States,
Nos. 94-6648 and 94-6649 (6th Cir. 1995).
42. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973).
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tion bulletin board-crosses all state lines, it allows local juries to use
local standards when applying the first two prongs of the Miller test.
This necessarily means that Internet content across the nation will be
judged by standards embraced by the most conservative communities.
There is nothing that the operator of a telephone or Internet-based
bulletin board can do absolutely to prohibit people in a specific state
from accessing the material.
The Thomas case raises important issues about the meaning of
"community" in the Internet context, where traditional notions of ge-
ography are no longer relevant. Should the Court abandon the com-
munity-based approach it adopted in Miller or should it define a new
type of community-a "virtual community" that takes into account
the technological realities of the medium?
A better question is whether obscenity laws should apply in
cyberspace at all. The accessibility, security, and anonymity of the In-
ternet for adults, combined with the ability to restrict access to inap-
propriate material by children, make it an ideal medium for serving
the values the Supreme Court identified in Stanley v. Georgia." The
fundamental "right to receive information and ideas, regardless of
their social worth"" and the "right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusion into one's pri-
vacy,"45 suggest that if it is possible to receive obscenity in the home
without posing any of the risks that distribution was feared to inher-
ently impose, for example, exposure to minors, accidental exposure to
unwitting adults, and "secondary" effects, then the First Amendment
would require that the government permit it. The right of adults, in
the privacy of their homes, to possess obscene material is meaningless
unless someone has the right to distribute it to them; it is only the
threat of possible harm posed by distribution, and not posed by pos-
session, that prompted the Court to permit the criminalization of dis-
tribution.46 If the technology of the Internet eliminates, or decreases
sufficiently, those risks, then it would follow that the distribution of
obscenity through that medium should no longer fall outside the pro-
tection of the First Amendment. If "our whole constitutional heri-
tage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
43. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1968).
44. Id. at 564.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 566-68.
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men's minds,"47 as Justice Marshall wrote for the Court in Stanley,
then technology may eliminate the need to permit the government
that power.
The Thomas case illustrates the fact that, even though obscenity
law is applied to date without regard for the medium of communica-
tion, the technologies and structure of the Internet clearly affect how
liability for obscenity will be measured. The case also brings into fo-
cus the issue of whether liability for obscenity in cyberspace serves the
Supreme Court's stated objectives for permitting regulation of ob-
scenity in the first place in light of competing First Amendment
values.
III. COPYRIGHT
Applying copyright law to the Internet raises equally challenging
issues. U.S. copyright protection extends only to expression. No mat-
ter how original or creative, "[i]n no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, pro-
cess, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery, re-
gardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work."48 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele-
phone Service Company,49 a unanimous Supreme Court stressed:
"The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that '[n]o author
may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.' . . . [C]opyright as-
sures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages
others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a
work." 0
Facts may not be copyrighted because they "do not owe their ori-
gin to an act of authorship."'51 The basis for the exclusion of facts and
ideas from copyright protection, according to the Court, is the U.S.
Constitution. 2 They are therefore "not 'original' in the constitutional
sense."53  And "[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement."'
Although "[iut may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the com-
47. Id. at 565.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
49. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1990).
50. Id. at 344-45, 349 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 556 (1984)).
51. Id. at 347.
52. Id. at 346-47.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 346.
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piler's [as opposed to creator's] labor may be used by others without
compensation, ' 55 the unanimous Court stressed in Feist that "this is
not 'some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme.' It is, rather,
'the essence of copyright,' and a constitutional requirement."56
Given the constitutional importance of not extending copyright
protection to facts or ideas, courts will not protect expression if it in-
cludes one of a limited number of ways of conveying an idea, concept
or fact, or if it is necessary to implementing an idea or concept. Under
the doctrine of "merger," courts withhold copyright protection from
original, fixed expression if that expression "must necessarily be used
as incident to"57 the work's underlying ideas or data.58 The doctrine
of merger highlights the importance of preventing copyright law from
ever protecting a fact or idea: it is preferable to exclude otherwise
protectable expression from copyright law's monopoly rather than to
allow that monopoly to extend to any fact or idea.
This limit reflects the law's purpose of protecting copyright
holder's rights only as a means to promote creativity. The whole fo-
cus of copyright law, and the structure of current protection, is to pro-
vide incentives for creating and disseminating expression for the
benefit of the public. The public's interest in copyright is not secon-
dary to the interests of copyright holders; it is the basis for those
rights. The Supreme Court has written that "[tihe sole interest of the
United States and the principal object in conferring the monopoly [of
copyright law] lie in the general benefits derived by the public from
the labors of authors."59
The structure of copyright law reflects this purpose. The law
grants creators only those rights necessary to exploit the market po-
tential of their works. Copyright holders alone may reproduce, adapt,
distribute, and publicly perform and display their expression.60 How-
ever, copyright holders are powerless to prevent copyright users from
making any other use of copyrighted expression, and any use at all of
the facts or ideas conveyed by that expression. Creators do not have
to create; if they create, they do not have to disseminate. But if they
do create and disseminate, they have very few rights to control the
55. Id. at 349.
56. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 589 Brennan, J., dissenting)) (citations omit-
ted).
57. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
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private uses of their copyrighted works. They cannot deny the public
the ability to use a work for its intended purpose, that is, if the work is
a book, to read it; if a painting, to display it; if a song, to sing it; if a
computer program, to run it. Other countries neither recognize such
user rights, nor impose limits on private use of the facts or ideas con-
tained in a copyrighted work. For example, Great Britain charges a
royalty every time a library loans a book.61 The United States has
eschewed such limits on the public access to copyrighted works.
Copyright law applies much the same way on the Internet: it pro-
hibits access and protects ideas and facts. Yet it also dramatically ex-
pands the monopoly granted to copyright holders. On the Net, a user
can access digital expression only through a reproduction in RAM62
or on a hard drive, floppy disk, or magnetic tape.63 This is an essential
characteristic of digital technologies. It is simply impossible to read,
view, listen to, print, upload, download, transfer, or otherwise access
digital expression without making at least one copy of it. That one
copy violates the copyright holder's exclusive right to reproduce. Ac-
cording to the report, Intellectual Property and the National Informa-
tion Infrastructure, issued by the Clinton Administration Task Force
Working Group on Intellectual Property.
[I]n each of the instances set out below, one or more copies is
made:
When a work is placed into a computer, whether on a disk,
diskette, ROM, or other storage device or in RAM for more than a
very brief period, a copy is made.
When a printed work is "scanned" into a digital file, a copy-
the digital file itself-is made.
When other works-including photographs, motion pictures, or
sound recordings-are digitized, copies are made.
61. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 163-64 (1994); John Cole, Public Lend-
ing Right, 42 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS IwO. BuLL. 427 (Dec. 12, 1983).
62. RAM refers to random access memory and is the computer's active, "thinking" mem-
ory. RAM must be constantly "refreshed" by electric current to retain its digital content. Un-
like other forms of digital media, RAM is erased when a computer is turned off. See generally
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 671
(1994) (holding that a copy in RAM is "fixed" within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988));
Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 1994 WL 446049, *5, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5390,
*17 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 362-63
(E.D. Va. 1994).
63. See Michael D. McCoy & Needham J. Boddie, II, Cybertheft: Will Copyright Law Pre-
vent Digital Tyranny on the Superhighway?, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169, 185 (1995) ("Virtu-
ally every transmittal of a work across the superhighway will involve the exclusive right to copy.
Printing to paper, copying to disk, and loading into memory all amount to reproduction.").
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Whenever a digitized file is "uploaded" from a user's computer
to a bulletin board system or other server, a copy is made.
Whenever a digitized file is "downloaded" from a bulletin
board system (BBS) or other server, a copy is made.
When a file is transferred from one computer network user to
another, multiple copies generally are made.
Under current technology, when an end-user's computer is em-
ployed as a "dumb" terminal to access a file resident on another com-
puter such as a BBS or Internet host, a copy of at least the portion
viewed is made in the user's computer. Without such copying into the
RAM or the buffer of the user's computer, no screen display would be
possible.6'
Moreover, to read or otherwise view digital expression on a com-
puter screen, or to listen to it through computer speakers, requires
that the digital work be "displayed" or "performed," within the mean-
ing of copyright law.6 5 In the case of digital expression downloaded
from a computer network, the display or performance meets the statu-
tory definition of "public," even though the location of the computer
may not be open to the public.66 This violates the copyright holder's
exclusive rights to display publicly and perform her copyrighted
work.67
64. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELL.ETUAL PROPERTY AND THE NA-
TIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 65-66 (1995).
65. Under the Copyright Act, "display" is defined as "to show a copy of it, either directly or
by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1988). The Act defines "perform" as "to recite, render, dance, play, or act it, either directly or
by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible." Id.
66. The Copyright Act includes in its definition of public display or performance "to trans-
mit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work.., to the public, by means
of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the perform-
ance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
different times." Id. This language and its legislative history suggest that no one need actually
receive the performance or display; it must be merely capable of being received by the public.
"[A] performance made available by transmission to the public at large is 'public' even though
the recipients are not gathered in a single place, and even if there is no proof that any of the
potential recipients was operating his receiving apparatus at the time of the transmission." H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976); see also On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia
Picture Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 790-91 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
67. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554, 1559 (1993) (holding that
the defendant's operation of a computer bulletin board service, which provided users with unau-
thorized copies of digitized copyrighted photographs, violated the plaintiff copyright holder's
exclusive right to display those works publicly); see also McCoy & Boddie, supra note 62, at 189
("[A] public display occurs every time a user browses a copyrighted work on the superhighway.
Consequently, an owner's right to display may be the broadest of all the exclusive rights in the
context of the superhighway, because a majority of uses constitute a public display.").
[VOL. 39:565
Law in Cyberspace
The new technological environment is radically altering the im-
pact of copyright law. The broad application of the exclusive rights to
reproduce and to display and perform publicly, prohibits public access
to expression in the digital context of the Internet. This is a dramatic
extension of and contravention of the policies underlying the copy-
right holder's rights in nondigital contexts, where users may read, see,
or hear expression in the market without the copyright holder's per-
mission. Of even greater significance is the fact that the holder of a
copyright in expression that is found only on the Internet can deny the
public access to the facts or ideas contained within that expression,
and not just to the expression itself, because there is no way to obtain
those facts and ideas from the Internet without copying and publicly
displaying or performing the expression as well.
Consider, for example, a newspaper. If published on paper, any
person is free to read a copy in a library, over someone's shoulder in
the subway, or in any other place where the printed paper is located.
The reader can use the facts and ideas found within that paper without
copying the paper's expression-and thus, without violating the copy-
right laws. If that same paper is published only on the Net, the reader
can only get access by first copying the paper into RAM or onto a
hard drive or floppy disk. Unless authorized by the copyright holder,
accessing the paper thus violates the copyright holder's exclusive right
to reproduce. Then actually to read the paper, the user must display it
on her screen, violating the right to display the work publicly, or to
obtain a copy, the user must download the paper, violating the right to
reproduce the work again. The Net user cannot access or use facts or
ideas in the newspaper without necessarily reproducing and publicly
displaying the copyrighted expression. As a result, on the Internet,
copyright law protects facts and ideas, not merely expression. The
technology is turning the law on its head.
IV. CONCLUSION
Obscenity and copyright laws provide only two of many examples
of how existing law may be dramatically altered when applied to the
Internet. These examples suggest that lawmakers, judges, attorneys,
and legal scholars must understand the technological and other fea-
tures of the Internet, before rushing to apply existing legal precedents
and theories. Regrettably, the technologies, lingo, decentralization,
and dynamic character of the Internet frighten many. The very fear
of Internet complexities and the lack of Internet experience, which
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should quell the impulse to regulate, have led many-particularly in
Congress and the Administration-to pursue hasty, unwise, and ill-
considered regulatory policies. It is easy to understand why one re-
sponse to the frontier quality of the Internet has been a push to regu-
late. But common sense, as well as constitutional impediments,
should stay even the well-meaning regulatory hand.
Not all laws yield results as counterproductive as the obscenity
and copyright laws do when applied to the Internet. In fact, the In-
ternet may give new meaning to some longstanding legal paradigms.
Consider the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
written that "[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market."68
Judge Learned Hand wrote in 1943 that the First Amendment "pre-
supposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.
To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it
our all."6 9 The "marketplace" metaphor, however worthy, has had lit-
tle meaning in the physical world, where the ability to reach large
audiences is controlled by a handful of major media corporations. On
the Internet, however, anyone armed with a computer and a modem
can become an author, artist, and creator, as well as a reader and
viewer. She has the same access to the same on-line audience as the
largest broadcaster and newspaper. For the first time since the print-
ing press, the telegraph, and the radio set the stage for tremendous
inequality among speakers, the speech "marketplace" may be a real-
ity. The Internet gives real meaning to the constitutional preference
for a "multitude of tongues."
Marchant and Kurz help focus our attention on the need to con-
sider carefully the applicability of existing legal norms to the on-line
world. Marchant's argument, in particular, for creating a legal and
policy framework for the on-line world, rather than "dragging current
traditional precedents into the on-line world, and forcing the on-line
world to fit the mold,"7 is both far-sighted and correct. Certainly, our
considerable experience with existing legal paradigms offers valuable
lessons even for the new, complex world of the Internet. Addition-
ally, the principles that undergird existing law remain vital. We will
68. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
69. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
70. Marchant, supra note 15, at 500.
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never realize the Internet's potential for allowing expression, or for
any other purpose, however, until we recognize the effect of cyber-
space on the application of existing laws. Appreciating what is differ-
ent about the Internet will not necessarily cause us to alter the
objectives that we have identified over the past 200 years as guiding
our lawmaking and judicial processes. Rather, that understanding
should help us assure that the laws we create for, and apply to, the
Internet continue to serve those objectives.
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